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FORUM ISSUES IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF  




Jurisdictional conflict between judicial fora is often a common issue in countries that use a mix of specialist and regular Courts to resolve civil 
and criminal cases. In Nigeria, owing largely to lack of clear guiding princi-
ples, this conflict reflects presently in the judicial determination of the regu-
latory obligations of the country’s public companies. 
This paper focuses on this conflict. It examines statutory and case law 
rules at the centre of the jurisdictional conflict between the Federal High 
Court and the Investment and Securities Tribunal, in relation to the enforce-
ment of reporting obligations of Nigerian public companies. As a contri-
bution to regulatory clarity and law reform, it proposes and discusses nor-
mative principles for the resolution of this perceived jurisdictional conflict. 
Keywords: regulation, jurisdiction, banking, public companies.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on how to resolve jurisdictional conflicts in the en-forcement of regulatory obligations of Nigerian public companies.1 Es-
sentially it examines perceived forum questions in relation to the jurisdiction 
of the Nigerian Federal High Court (FHC), the Nigerian Investment and 
Securities Tribunal (IST) and the Administrative Proceedings of the Nigerian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The forum questions relate to 
trial jurisdictional relations between the FHC and the IST on matters, which 
are first, purely within the respective remit of the CAC, CBN, and SEC; and 
second, on those matters, which intersect banking, corporate, securities law 
and general financial reporting obligations. Three decisions of the Nigerian 
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Court of Appeal (Ajayi v SEC;2 Nospecto Oil & Gas Ltd v Olorunnimbe & 
15 Ors;3 and Okeke v SEC & 2 Ors.4), which we shall discuss in this paper 
presently, exemplify the jurisdictional conflict and the concomitant forum 
questions. 
This paper is divided into six sections. The first is this introduction. 
The second section examines the theoretical accounts of public regulation 
and situates this paper within the public interest theory. The third section 
examines forum questions implicated in jurisdictional relations between the 
FHC and the IST. The fourth section discusses certain normative principles 
to address this conflict. The fifth section applies the principles enunciated in 
the fourth section to Ajayi; Nospecto; and Okeke. The sixth section sum-
marises and concludes the paper.
2. THEORIES OF CORPORATE AND  
SECURITIES REGULATION 
There are divergent theoretical accounts on how and why corporate and se-curities regulation emerged; on which actors contributed to this emergence 
and the pattern of interactions between these actors. However, two broad cat-
egories of theories are identifiable namely: the ‘public interest’ and ‘private 
interest’ theories of regulation. In what follows below we would critique the 
two theoretical accounts and situate this paper within a public interest account.
Public Interest Theories
Public interest theories explain regulation in terms of a general societal ne-cessity for the State’s regulatory intervention to rectify perceived imperfec-
tions of the market system so as to achieve the collective public interest. The 
State’s regulatory intervention on this view, promotes behaviours that in the 
absence of such intervention are believed not to occur.5 Implicitly, regulation is 
mainly intended to defend the interests of the general public and thereby attain 
the common good; that is the society’s socio-economic well being as a whole.6 
2 [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 1.
3 Appeal No: CA/L/474/11. 
4 Appeal No: CA/L/13/2009.
5 A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 
1, 2; R. Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ [1974] The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Sciences 335. 
6 C. Uche, ‘The Theory of Regulation: A Review Article’ [2000] Journal of Financial Regula-
tion and Compliance 68.
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7 Posner (n 5) 336. For a more recent and extensive discussion of this point see generally: 
C. Calomiris and S. Haber, Fragile By Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and 
Scarce Credit (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014). 
8 R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (Ox-
ford: OUP 1999) 19. 
9 A. Ogus, ‘Whither the Economic Theory of Regulation? What Economic Theory of Regu-
lation?’ in J. Jordana and D. Levi-Faur, Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2004) 35. 
10 Parens patriae is the Latin for ‘parent of the country.’ As a legal doctrine it has its roots in 
English common law. In feudal times various obligations and powers, collectively referred 
to as the ‘royal prerogative,’ were reserved for the king. The king exercised these functions 
in his role as father of the country. In modern times, the doctrine supports the inherent 
power and authority of the State to protect persons who are legally unable to act on their 
own behalf. For more on this doctrine see resource available at: <http://legal-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/Parens+Patriae> accessed on 2 December 2014. 
Applied to corporate and securities regulation, public interest theorists 
perceive markets as extremely fragile and prone to operate very inefficiently 
or inequitably if left alone.7 Corporate and securities regulation thus takes 
the form of an indispensable application of communal power through gov-
ernment, with the purpose of overcoming possible failures of the assump-
tions which support the market system,8 such as the Efficient Market Hy-
pothesis (EMH) that we shall discuss later under private interest theories. 
Although the public interests theorists conceive regulation as instrumental 
for the correction of market failures and as a means to advance the gen-
eral welfare and society’s common economic interests, they do not define 
the common good in a restricted sense of ensuring a safe and sound finan-
cial market. Rather, they take a broader approach according to which the 
State’s regulatory intervention is directed towards socially efficient use and 
allocation of scarce public resources as well as to protect vulnerable mem-
bers of the society, who in the absence of regulation would be subject to 
social injustice.9 The efficiency, egalitarian and humanitarian persuasions of 
the public interest theorists notwithstanding, their theoretical assumptions 
arguably provoke at least two critical questions.
First, it is debatable whether we can easily separate public interest theo-
ries of regulation from regulatory paternalism- the idea that the State as the 
contemporary parens patriae should always be ready to protect the weak 
and intervene on behalf of the feeble through regulatory intervention.10 The 
assumption that the Sate’s regulatory intervention is essential and would al-
ways be justified to protect the weak, feeble and vulnerable is not necessarily 
true in all cases and in some cases could even become an unreasonable pa-
ternalism. This would be the case for instance where the vulnerability of the 
person to be protected is self-induced, such as where an investor in disdain 
of obvious risk and without availing herself of professional advice invests 
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in a high-risk investment scheme with the hope of reaping high short-term 
returns but ended up losing her investment. 
Equally, the State’s regulatory intervention may also engage unreason-
able paternalism in situations where those to be protected - such as institu-
tional investors- ought to be financially knowledgeable enough to look after 
their interests. Unreasonable paternalism is also engaged by the assumption 
that the State’s regulatory intervention is necessary in cases where those to 
be protected are well able to regulate themselves such as we have in the case 
of self-regulatory organisations in most financial markets who thus far have 
satisfactorily run stock markets and commodities exchanges. 
We can indeed question whether the State’s regulatory intervention as 
argued by the public interests theorists is necessary in all cases and in all 
aspects of the financial markets. Assuming arguendo that there might be 
situations that require the State’s regulatory intervention in the financial 
system, we can still question on how and to what extent is the intervention 
justifiable. It is argued consistently with the overall approach adopted in 
this research that the State’s regulatory intervention in this respect ought 
to be justifiable on five key grounds namely: to establish the parameters of 
financial regulation; set up and maintain the rules and institutions essential 
for the implementation of regulatory objectives; to ‘re-balance’ the foun-
dational asymmetries of power, means and information between business 
organisations and their customers; to ensure that public regulation is per-
formed accountably, efficiently and effectively; and to ensure that remedial 
consequences attach to losses that members of the society may suffer from 
the relational asymmetries in the financial services industry and from negli-
gent performance of public regulation. 
The second question relates to the implicit assumption of the public inter-
est theorists that the State’s regulatory intervention is effective and that it can 
be implemented without cost. Government regulation can sometimes prove 
to be unsuccessful in reaching its objectives and even costly. It can be un-
successful for instance and where the administrative regulatory agencies are 
requested to fulfill overlapping and (or) ‘underlapping’ functions in a manner 
that distorts efficient financial regulation and the efficient functioning of the 
financial markets.11 Government regulation can also be costly. This can oc-
cur for instance if effective and efficient regulation is seen mainly in terms of 
increase in the quantity of regulation (more rules and compliance standards) 
and not as an increase in the quality of regulation (focus on better regulation). 
11 Posner (n 5) 339.
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12 I. Ehrlich and R. Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Rules-Making’ (1974) Journal of 
Legal Studies 260. 
13 Posner (n 5) 335; Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 21; A. Estache and D. Martimort, ‘Politics, Trans-
action Costs, and Design of Regulatory Institutions’ (1999) World Bank Policy Research 
Paper 2073, 9 – 10, 16 – 18. 
Increase in the quantity of regulation through the introduction of more and 
more rules, compliance measures and regulatory inspections without a corre-
sponding consideration of the effect these might have on the cost of compli-
ance for financial intermediaries can lead to burdensome compliance costs.12
The foregoing questions do not necessarily suggest the irrelevance of the 
public interests theories for this paper. Rather, they point to the need to rework 
their basic assumptions to address the concerns about unreasonably regulato-
ry paternalism, regulatory accountability, regulatory overlap and ‘underlap’ 
and the cost implications of an emphasis on the quantity of regulation. A 
consideration of how these assumptions could and should be reworked is be-
yond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, this paper situates itself within the 
assumptions of the public interest theorists, which we accept as a convincing 
background for the reform-oriented principles and strategies to be espoused 
subsequently in this thesis. Four key points justify our alignment with the pub-
lic interest theorists. The public interest account generally speaks to what gov-
ernments and administrative regulatory agencies should do; and satisfactorily 
explain what they actually do in the wider context of public administration.
The public interest theorists’ assumptions persuasively justify contem-
porary manifestations of corporate and securities regulation across jurisdic-
tions. Further, the rationale behind regulation as propounded by the public 
interest theorists provides a convincing theoretical basis for the compre-
hension of the objectives which financial regulations aims to accomplish in 
practice. The public interest account also supplies a basis to interrogate the 
relevance of the private interest theories of regulation for this paper.
Private Interest Theories 
Centrally private interest theorists assume that as a consequence of the high-stakes and the interests in the outcome of policy or regulatory deci-
sions, interest groups affected by regulation will focus their resources and en-
ergies to promote the policy outcomes they prefer. The result of interest group 
influence is that the positive aims of regulation are weakened and regulatory 
effectiveness and efficiency are compromised with the advantages of regula-
tory reform ending up being unequally distributed and benefitting those in-
volved in lobbying the legislators at the expense of the society at large.13
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Applied to financial regulation, private interest theorists hold that the 
financial services industry controls governmental institutions including par-
ticularly the administrative regulatory agencies that are responsible for su-
pervising the economy.14 Through such control, the industry influences the 
financial regulatory and supervisory processes in a manner that is exclusive-
ly to its own benefit. The influence thus exercised by the financial services 
industry speaks to regulatory capture. On the private interests account this 
occurs when regulations that are initially meant to serve the public good 
eventually serve that of powerful and influential private interests who are 
able to influence policy-makers and regulatory officials.15 
Further, a chequered and refined adaption of the private interest theo-
ries in finance and financial regulation is the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) according to which financial markets are ‘informationally efficient’ 
and work less because of law, the State’s regulatory intervention or the 
threat of liability, but because market information are provided, collected, 
verified and disseminated by private reputational intermediaries (investment 
banks, auditors, securities analysts and credit rating agencies) who implied-
ly pledge their reputational capital behind their opinions and judgments.16 
Hence, these intermediaries would have little incentive to misrepresent or 
distort.17 Regulatory intervention on this account is thus justified when the 
market is ‘informationally inefficient’ where intermediaries misrepresent or 
distort market information.
In its pristine and refined forms, the private interest account does not 
supply a convincing theoretical foundation for this paper on three grounds. 
First and in its pristine form, the private interest account is not sufficiently 
distinguishable from the public interest account given that both accounts 
base themselves on the assumption that the public interest is the basis for 
14 Posner (n 5) 341.
15 J. Hertog, ‘General Theories of Regulation,’ (1999) 225 <www.scribd.com/doc/239491/
General-Theories-of-Regulation > accessed 26 February 2015.
16 EMH’s history is remarkably chequered and refined because it has been the subject of 
scholarly discussion since 1863 and it contemporary is inflexion arguably plays downs the 
undertone of financial markets regulatory manipulation that is apparent from a cursory ap-
praisal of the private interest account. For an extensive background on EMH with its roots 
in the work of Jules Regnault, a French stockbroker, published in 1863 < http://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Efficient-market_hypothesis#cite_note-desai-4 > accessed 16 November 2014. 
17 For more on this point and the related Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECHM) see 
generally: E. Fama, ‘The Behaviour of Stock Market Prices’ (1965) 38 Journal of Business, 
35 – 105; ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 
25(2) Journal of Finance 383 – 417; R. Gilson and R. Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency,’ (1984) 70 Va. L. Rev., 549, 619 – 21; G. Cooper, The Origin of Finan-
cial Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy (Petersfield: 
Harriman House Ltd 2008) 25 – 7. 
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the initiation of regulation. Second, it is unclear why and how the financial 
services industry is successful in subjecting administrative regulatory agen-
cies to their interests but fail to prevent the establishment of these agencies 
by policy-makers in the first place. Third and in its refined formulation, 
investors and researchers have disputed both empirically and theoretically 
the validity of EMH. Theoretically, behavioural economists attribute the 
imperfections in financial markets to a combination of cognitive biases such 
as overconfidence, overreaction, representative bias, information bias and 
various other predictable human errors in reasoning and information pro-
cessing. Psychologists have studied and confirmed the existence of these er-
rors.18 For instance, these errors in reasoning lead most investors to avoid 
value stocks and buy growth stocks at expensive prices, which allows those 
who reason correctly to profit from bargains in neglected value stocks and 
the overreacted selling of growth stocks. 
Similarly while empirical evidence has been mixed, they have not gen-
erally supported EMH.19 Notably, while a strong form of the EMH claims 
that market prices instantly change to reflect new public information and 
even hidden ‘insider’ information, a study of low price-earnings ratio stocks 
in United States found that these stocks have greater returns which are not 
correlated with either publicly available or insider information on their pric-
es.20 It is debatable also if EMH convincingly explains the workings of fi-
nancial markets in developing countries which have been empirically shown 
to be inefficient in that they exhibit considerable serial correlation (price-
trends), non-random walk and evidence of manipulation.21 
Although the private interest theories of financial regulation do not pro-
vide a convincing foundation for this paper, private interests can still play 
salutary roles in the regulatory process. These roles should be objectively 
recognised. For instance, financial services industry lobby groups can share 
18 See for instance the recent leading work in this area by D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and 
Slow (London: Penguin Books, 2012) 109 – 198 (Part II. Heuristics and Biases) 199 – 268 
(Part III. Overconfidence) 269 – 376 (choices). 
19 For empirical studies that question EMH see F. Nicholson, ‘Price-Earning Ratios in Rela-
tion to Investment Results’ [1968] Financial Analysts Journal 105 – 109; S. Basu, ‘Invest-
ment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price-Earnings Ratios: A Test 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis’ (1977) 32 Journal of Finance 663 – 682; B. Rosenberg, 
K. Reid, R. Lanstein, ‘Persuasive Evidence of Market Inefficiency’ (1985) 13 Journal of 
Portfolio Management 9 – 17; C. Chan, E. Gup, and M. Pan, ‘International Stock Market 
Efficiency and Integration: A Study of Eighteen Nations’ (2003) 24 (6) Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting 803 – 813. 
20 N. Dreman and A. Berry, ‘Overreaction, Underreaction, and the Low-P/E Effect,’ (1995) 
51(4) Financial Analysts Journal 21–30. 
21 B. Malkiel, ‘Investment Opportunities in China’ (2007) referenced in the EMH online re-
source in n 16.
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their expertise with legislators and policy-makers which all else the same 
should allow for a more informed laws and policies to be made. It reflects 
indeed, best practice and a process driven financial regulation to formally 
consult the industry about draft regulatory measures in order to give those 
who fall within the scope of the planned legislation the opportunity to ex-
press their views on the proposal. What is objectionable is when financial 
services industry lobbyists have extensive privileged access to policy-makers 
and exercise unwholesome influence on the legislative process and in rela-
tion to matters that affect their collective interests.22 
3. FORUM QUESTIONS 
In this section, we shall examine forum questions, relating to the FHC and IST together with the APC. 
The Federal High Court23
Generally, the FHC has exclusive trial jurisdiction over any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any 
executive or administrative action or decision by the CBN, CAC, and SEC 
as federal agencies.24 Specifically, the FHC has exclusive jurisdiction in civil 
causes and matters arising from the operation of BOFIA and (or) connected 
with or pertaining to banking, including a banker customer dispute.25 The 
court also has exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters arising from 
the operation of CAMA or any other enactment regulating the operations of 
companies incorporated under CAMA.26 
22 This phenomenon is arguably pervasive in western developed markets as evidenced by 
the following mass media revelations: SpinWatch, ‘Doing God’s Work: How Goldman 
Sachs Rigs the Game’ March 2011 <www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-category-main-
menu-8/48-lobbying/5426-the-power-offinancial-lobbyists-must-be-curtailed> accessed 9 
September 2014; A Rowell, ‘The Power of Financial Lobbyists Must be Curtailed’ Spin-
Watch 20 March 2014 <www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-category-mainmenu-8/48-lobby-
ing/5426-the-power-offinancial-lobbyists-must-be-curtailed > accessed 9 September 2012. 
In March 2011 a report by an undercover team from the UK’s Sunday Times newspaper 
alleged that the MEPs had accepted offers of cash in exchange for influencing laws. As 
reported in the Sunday Times, four members of the European Parliament accepted a bribe 
from journalists, pretending to be lobbyists, in return for the watering down of a proposal 
for the reform of financial regulation.
23 The FHC was established by section 249 (1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Ni-
geria (CFRN), 1999 (formerly, section 228(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979) as the successor court to the Federal Revenue Court, established by section 
1 (1) of the Federal Revenue Court Act of 1973, now restyled as the Federal High Court 
(FHC) Act of 1973. 
24 CFRN 1999, s 251(1) (r).
25 ibid s 251(1) (d).
26 ibid s 251 (1) (e); FHC Act 1973, s 7(1) (c)(ii).
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In effect, the FHC has a disjunctive exclusive jurisdiction over matters 
arising from CAMA on the one hand, and (or) matters arising from other 
laws (such as the ISA) that regulate the operations of companies.27 Skencon-
sult (Nig.) Ltd v Ukey28 supports this interpretation. It is a Nigerian author-
ity for the proposition that the FHC has exclusive jurisdiction on matters 
arising from CAMA. But the case was decided when CAMA, then known as 
the Companies Act of 1968, was the only law regulating incorporation of 
companies and dealings in companies’ shares. However, with the enactment 
of the ISA, and the resulting removal of dealing in securities, from CAMA, it 
is arguable if Skenconsult remains a strong authority for the exclusive juris-
diction of the FHC on matters, which were formerly contained in the 1968 
Act. At any rate, while the FHC’s exclusive jurisdiction over pure BOFIA 
related matters, is hardly disputable, the question (examined fully below) is 
whether with the creation of the IST the FHC’s exclusive jurisdiction still 
extends to matters arising from the ISA?29 This it is submitted, is notionally 
possible on three grounds: first, the CFRN, 1999, upon which the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the FHC is founded, overrides all other laws in Nigeria,30 
which means prima facie that the ISA cannot limit the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the FHC over administrative or executive actions and (or) decisions of 
federal agencies including SEC. A fortiori and secondly, the ISA is expressly 
made subject to the CFRN, 1999.31 
In view of the foregoing, is it arguable that the FHC implicitly has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to decide cases arising from violations of the ISA, includ-
ing in particular, the violations of reporting obligations imposed on listed 
27 This interpretation of section 251 (1) (e) of the CFRN, 1999, is consistent with section 18 
(3), of the Nigerian Interpretation Act, which provides to the effect that ‘[t]he word “or” 
and the word “other” shall in any enactment, be construed disjunctively and not as imply-
ing similarity.’ 
28 [1981] NSCC 1. This is a leading authority on this point. On the facts, the respondent, a 
director of the appellant company litigated a boardroom dispute over the management of 
the appellant company, before the defunct Bendel State High Court (with the creation of 
the Edo and Delta states from the old Bendel State, now Delta state and Edo state High 
Courts). On a final appeal to the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Nnamani JSC, applying section 
7 (1)(c)(1), of the Federal Revenue Court Act No. 13 of 1973, (the predecessor provision to 
section 251(1)(e) of the CFRN 1999 and section 7(1) (c)(ii) of the FHC Act) held that (at 
page 13 – 14) that the Federal High Court, the predecessor to the FHC, was the competent 
forum for the trial of the case.  
29 The IST was established under Part XIV of the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 1999 
(now Part XVI of the ISA 2007) to have exclusive trial jurisdiction over matters arising 
from the ISA.
30 Section 1(3) of the CFRN 1999 provides that if any other law is inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void.
31 ISA 2007, s 312 (3). 
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companies and their officers under the Act? There are as yet no clear an-
swers to this question. The lack of clarity arguably arises from the fact that 
the IST (as shown below) is by law conferred with exclusive jurisdiction 
over matters arising from the ISA, 2007, which means that disputes arising 
from an action or determination of the SEC pursuant to the provisions of 
the ISA are litigable only before the IST. We shall return to these questions 
in greater detail later in this article. 
Investments and Securities Tribunal
The Investment and Securities Tribunal (IST) is a judicial body estab-lished by section 274 of the ISA, 2007.32 By law, although not con-
stitutionally, the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine 
any question of law or dispute involving, (a) decision or determination of 
the SEC, (b) SEC and a capital market self regulatory organisation, (c) a 
capital operator and SEC, (d) an investor and SEC, (e) an issuer of securities 
and SEC, and (f) disputes arising from the administration, management and 
operation of collective investment schemes.33 The IST is not expressly men-
tioned in the CFRN, 1999, unlike the FHC, but its creation arguably derives 
from section 6(4)(a) of the Constitution. That section empowers the Na-
tional Assembly of Nigeria to establish courts other than those to which the 
section relates, but with subordinate jurisdiction to that of a High Court.34 
The interpretive effect of this power can be approached from at least 
two interpretive perspectives, which ultimately lead to one conclusion. First, 
it can literally be taken to mean that the National Assembly is at liberty to 
create other courts, but the courts so created shall rank lower and not su-
perior to, or equal in status to a (Federal) High Court. Second, on a purpo-
sive – advancing the constitutional object – approach, it can mean that the 
32 Formerly section 224 of the ISA, 1999. The tribunal has ‘to the exclusion of any other 
court of law or body in Nigeria,’ jurisdiction to hear and determine any question of law or 
dispute involving the following (a) a decision of the SEC in the operation of and application 
of the ISA; (b) SEC and self regulatory organisations in the securities sector; (c) a capital 
market operator and SEC; (d) an investor and SEC; (e) an issuer of securities and SEC; and 
capital; and (f) disputes arising from the administration, management and operation of 
collective investment schemes. 
33 ISA 2007, s 284.
34 The courts to which the section relates are enumerated in section 4(5) (a) – (k) are: the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria; the Court of Appeal; the Federal High Court; the High Court 
of the Federal Capital Territory; a High Court of a State; the Sharia Court of Appeal of 
the Federal Capital Territory; a Sharia Court of Appeal of a State; a Customary Court of 
Appeal of a State; such other courts as may be authourised by law to exercise jurisdiction 
at first instance or on appeal on matters with respect to the National Assembly, or a House 
of Assembly of a State may make law. 
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Federal High Court shall be superior to any other court or tribunal that the 
National Assembly may create. On either interpretation, the Federal High 
Court prima facie, is not intended to rank equally in the judicial hierarchy 
with a court or tribunal such as the IST, which the National Assembly has 
created to resolve inter alia, disputes arising from the ISA and the securities 
regulation, including the operations of listed companies. To the extent that 
this is so, how can the exclusive jurisdiction of the FHC on companies’ mat-
ters (discussed above) be reconciled with the equally exclusive jurisdiction 
of the IST,35 to hear and determine disputes between an issuer of securities 
and the SEC, considering that public companies can issue securities? As-
suming arguendo that the Constitution intends the IST to be subordinate to 
the FHC, why does an appeal against its decision, leapfrog the FHC to the 
CA?36 Does it mean that IST’s judgement takes effect as if it were a judgment 
of the FHC?37 If not, does it mean that the FHC’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
companies’ matters, including those with mixed corporate law and securi-
ties regulation implications, survives the creation of the IST? 
The ISA, 2007, and Ajayi, prima facie resolve the first issue in favour of 
the IST. Again, the CFRN, 1999,38 and the ISA, 2007,39 prima facie resolve 
the second issue in favour of the FHC. But this should be checked against 
the following points: First, the IST came long after the FHC and it is argu-
ably meant to be a specialist court for the settlement of securities disputes. 
Second, the ISA, 1999, under which, the Tribunal was initially established, 
repealed and incorporated Part XVII, of CAMA, 1990, which formerly reg-
ulated dealing in securities. This suggests that the National Assembly, in-
tended to ‘carve out’ (and assign to the IST) disputes arising from dealing in 
securities from the expansive corporate law jurisdiction of the FHC. Third, 
IST’s judgment takes effect as a judgment of the FHC.40 Fourth, BOFIA, 
and CAMA, are to be read in conformity with the provisions of ISA, with 
respect to capital market matters.41 On the basis of these points, can one 
conclude that as between the FHC and IST, the real legislative intent of the 
National Assembly is that for the purposes of settling disputes arising from 
BOFIA, CAMA, FRCNA and the ISA, 2007, the two fora shall have coor-
dinate and complementary jurisdiction? 
35 ISA 2007, s 284 (1) (e).
36 ibid s 294(1).
37 ibid s 293(3).
38 ibid s 1 (3), 6(4)(a), 251(1) (e).
39 ibid s 313(2).
40 ibid s 293(3). 
41 ibid s 312(1).
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Alternatively, where a case for coordinate and complementary jurisdic-
tion cannot be convincingly made out and in anticipation of necessary law 
reform in this area to magnify this intent, should it be the case that the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the IST ought to trump the FHC’s in cases dealing 
purely with securities regulation and in those mixed cases initiated before 
the Tribunal, but which has only subsidiary implications for banking and 
(or) corporate regulations? We shall return to this question later in this ar-
ticle. 
The next section explores the principles for resolving the foregoing 
questions, arising from the state of the law and the authorities on the juris-
diction of the FHC, and that of the IST together with the APC, in respect 
of matters with mixed corporate law and securities regulation flavour? Pre-
cisely, we shall look at the conflict from at least two perspectives: first, cases 
dealing exclusively with securities regulation for instance, the contents of a 
prospectus and other offer documents; second, those mixed cases dealing 
with banking law, securities regulation, and general financial reporting ob-
ligation. 
4. NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES 
This section explores normative principles for the resolution of the above discussed forum questions in relation to the FHC and IST. 
We highlighted the five questions in relation to the jurisdictions of the 
FHC and IST, on matters, which are exclusively securities related and those 
with mixed implication for banking law, corporate law and securities reg-
ulation. In summary, the first question, addresses the FHC’s jurisdiction to 
decide mixed cases. The second, relates to whether the real legislative intent 
of the National Assembly, is that for the purposes of resolving disputes aris-
ing from the provisions of the BOFIA, CAMA, and ISA, the FHC and IST, 
shall have coordinate and complementary jurisdiction. Alternatively, and as 
a third question, should the exclusive jurisdiction of the IST be preserved in 
matters dealing purely with securities regulation, and in those cases where 
the SEC has commenced regulatory enforcement proceedings before the Tri-
bunal pursuant to the ISA, even in cases where that proceeding has impli-
cations for the enforcement remit of other regulators? The fourth, relates to 
the circumstances under which a challenge of an APC’s proceeding on the 
ground of violating the rules of natural justice should be sustained. 
With respect to the first question, it is considered useful to note the 
following facts: First, the statutory provisions that provide support for the 
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exclusive jurisdiction of the FHC on mixed cases, have been in existence 
since 1973, and before the establishment of the IST in 1999. Conceivably, 
at their inception, the provisions did not contemplate the establishment of 
the IST. Second, in 1999, the ISA No. 45 of 1999 established the IST to 
resolve securities disputes exclusively. Ostensibly and in furtherance of the 
new arrangement, section 263 (1) (d) of the Act, repealed and re-enacted 
Part XVII (sections 541 – 623) of CAMA, which regulates dealing in com-
pany securities. 
Third, to qualify as a judge of the FHC, a lawyer only needs to have ten 
years post call experience, which the Constitution does not require to be in 
corporate or securities law.42 In contrast, the IST comprises of a mix of ten 
judges most of whom must be knowledgeable in capital market matters.43 
Fourth, the IST is statutorily a civil court, whose judgement operates effec-
tively as a judgment of the FHC.44 In light of these facts, it is submitted that 
from the establishment of the IST in 1999, the National Assembly should 
be taken to intend that the (exclusive) jurisdiction of the FHC would not 
extend to securities matters, but rather remain limited to those matters that 
may arise from the provisions of BOFIA, and CAMA. It is submitted further 
and by parity of reasoning, that the National Assembly should be taken to 
intend that from 1999, the IST shall be a specialist tribunal for the trial of 
securities matters. 
The foregoing submissions coalesce in an adjudicatory principle of mu-
tually exclusive jurisdiction according to which, as between the FHC and 
IST, the former cannot competently adjudicate matters arising from the ISA; 
and the latter cannot do likewise for matters arising from CAMA. An en-
forcement action arising for instance from the breach of reporting obliga-
tions in the ISA, should only be pursued through the IST and upward to the 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Alternatively since the Nigerian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could not lawfully enforce the 
provisions of the laws regulating banks and registered companies (Banking 
and Other Financial Institutions Act and Companies and Allied Matters 
42 CFRN 1999, s 250 and 251 (1) (e); FHC Act, 1973 s 7(1) (c) (ii). 
43 The composition of the Tribunal as specified in section 275 (1) of the ISA 2007, is as fol-
lows: (a) a full time chairman who shall be a legal practitioner of no less than fifteen years 
with cognate experience in capital market matters; (b) four other full time members, three 
of whom shall be legal practitioners of no less than ten years experience and one person 
who shall be knowledgeable in capital market matters; and (c) five other part time members 
who shall be person of proven ability and expertise in corporate and capital market mat-
ters. 
44 ISA 2007, s 290 (3) and 293(3).
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Act) disputes that may arise from its enforcement of the law regulating the 
capital market (Investment and Securities Act) ought to be resolved in accor-
dance with the dispute resolution process contained in that law (i.e. before 
the IST). Similarly, since the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) 
and the CBN could not lawfully enforce the provisions of the ISA, disputes 
that may arise from their enforcement ought to be resolved pursuant to the 
dispute resolution process contained in the CAMA and BOFIA (i.e. before 
the FHC). By implication, neither the IST, nor the FHC, is a competent fo-
rum to seek declaratory and (or) injunctive reliefs, against an enforcement 
action, which by law will not come before it, but before the other. 
For either forum to be competent to do so, the regulator on record, 
should be the one, which according to the relevant law, can prosecute reg-
ulatory violations before that forum. This in effect means that, the idea 
that a defendant in a SEC enforcement proceeding, before the IST, which 
proceeding has only subsidiary or marginal implication for either banking 
regulation or company law, can approach the FHC for injunctive or declar-
atory reliefs, ostensibly to delay or frustrate the proceeding, should be re-
sisted. This is because it is likely to result in an abuse of judicial process, in 
the sense of invoking the jurisdiction of one forum, to frustrate a proceeding 
before another. It should not also be possible for such potentially abusive 
resort to the FHC, to be decided on the authority of Skenconsult, a case, 
which as stated earlier in this paper, was decided before the establishment of 
the IST in 1999 and the resulting separation of securities dispute resolution 
from the jurisdiction of the FHC.
It follows from the foregoing and in response to the second question 
above that in mixed cases, the jurisdictions of the IST and FHC ought in 
principle to be coordinate and complementary, in so far as neither of the 
two fora, purports to decide a case which from clear indications can be 
said to belong to the province of the other. Even so, how do we rationalise 
section 6(4)(a) of the CFRN, 1999, the apparent interpretive effect of which 
is that the IST shall be subordinate to the FHC. It is argued consistent with 
the foregoing principle of mutually exclusive jurisdiction that the provision 
should be construed similarly in principle, as applying to a court or tribunal 
whose judgement, unlike that of the IST, does not operate effectively as a 
judgment of the FHC. 
However, it should be pointed out that the enunciations here would 
need to be tested in court. In any event, and in response to the third ques-
tion, where a case for coordinate and complementary is not supported de 
lege lata, it is submitted that it ought in principle to be the case that the 
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exclusive jurisdiction of the IST be preserved. First in matters dealing purely 
with securities regulation; and second, in those cases where SEC has initiat-
ed enforcement proceeding before the tribunal pursuant to the ISA, 2007. 
This submission finds support, in the idea that the certainty and consistency 
of securities disputes resolution is most likely to be enhanced, where the IST 
as a specialist tribunal decides such disputes. 
In relation to the fourth question (natural justice challenge of an APC’s 
proceeding) it is settled that the rules of natural justice (audi alteram partem 
and nemo judex in causa sua) apply whenever a tribunal, be it adminis-
trative or judicial is called upon to decide the rights and obligations of a 
citizen, who may be a natural person or a corporate entity.45 Equally as a 
rule, only conventional courts can try a crime; and where an administrative 
court is confronted with a civil claim bounded up with a criminal allegation, 
it can decide the former, in so far as it is possible to severe it from the lat-
ter.46 Applied to the APC however, it is submitted that the two rules ought 
to be moderated by the principles of reasonable and substantial compli-
ance and totality of determination. Reasonable and substantial compliance 
means that an APC’s proceeding should not be invalidated on the ground 
of natural justice, where there is a verifiable separation of the Committee’s 
investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles. 
Additionally, although the board of the SEC, appoints the adjudicatory 
panel, but so long as it is demonstrable that subsequent to their appointment, 
the adjudicators had free rein to decide a complaint referred to them by SEC, 
the resulting decision(s) ought not to be invalidated on the ground that it 
breaches the nemo judex in causa sua rule. This is because, if it were possible 
for every alleged instance of such breach to serve as a basis for invalidating 
the decision of an administrative tribunal, the policy behind the delegation of 
a measure of judicial power to administrative so that they can, where neces-
sary, swiftly dispense ‘regulatory justice’ will be rendered almost inoperable.47
Further, totality of enforcement denotes that where a complaint referred 
to the APC, has a criminal element, it should be permissible in principle for 
45 See for support, section 36(1) of the CFRN, 1999; R v Chancellor of the University of 
Cambridge, ex parte Bentley 1 Str 557, 568; 93 ER 698, 704; Metropolitan Properties Co 
(FGC) Ltd v Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577; J. Kelly, ‘Audi Alteram Partem’ (1964) 9 Natural 
Law Forum 103,109.
46 Military Governor of Imo State v Uwauwa (1997) 4 NWLR 675.
47 See generally for support, Ching Wei Mang v Public Prosecutor [2002] 2 S.L.R. (R) 566, 
578 (High Court of Singapore) where Chief Justice Yong Pung How held that to establish 
a breach of natural justice by an administrative agency, the applicant has to prove that he 
had suffered substantial prejudice or injustice. 
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the committee to make a finding of guilt for the purposes of a disciplinary 
decision. The reasoning behind this view can be approached from two per-
spectives. First, a finding of guilt for a criminal offence by an administrative 
tribunal operates in reality, only as a disciplinary penalty, in that judicial 
power is not necessarily usurped by a finding of guilt, which does not oper-
ate as a conviction for a crime, but intended to serve as a basis for regulatory 
disciplinary action. 
Second, where an administrative body such as the APC, is legally em-
powered to decide complaints relating to the rights and obligations of oth-
ers, the body ought to be regarded as a tribunal established by law under 
section 36(1) of the CFRN, 1999. Implicitly, the body should be able to 
determine both civil and criminal cases that fall within its remit and subject 
to the right of the parties to appeal to higher courts or tribunals. 
In the next section, we shall adopt the foregoing principles and submis-
sions to critique decisions in Ajayi Okeke and Nospecto. 
5. AJAYI, OKEKE, AND NOSPECTO 
This section applies the principles and submissions above to critique Ajayi, Okeke, and Nospecto. As earlier mentioned, these are three con-
flicting decisions of the CA on basically three issues. These are: the compe-
tent adjudicatory forum for the trial of securities law matters arising from 
the ISA; the competent forum for the trial of mixed cases in which the SEC 
has initiated enforcement proceeding; and (in Ajayi, and Okeke) the extent 
to which an APC proceeding can be invalidated on the grounds of natu-
ral justice. This section argues, consistently with the foregoing principles 
and submissions, that Ajayi is to be preferred, while Okeke and Nospecto 
should be rejected, particularly as authorities on the trial jurisdiction of the 
FHC, in cases arising from the ISA. In support, the section presents four 
arguments, against the ratio and reasoning in Okeke. Similarly, three objec-
tions are argued, with respect to Nospecto. 
Ajayi v SEC
This appeal against the order of Nyako J. of the FHC, Lagos Division was decided on two grounds, namely: whether the trial judge was right 
in law, to hold that the ISA conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the IST in 
respect of matters relating to the operations of the Act; and whether the trial 
judge should have quashed the APC’s decision, on the Appellant’s allegation 
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it violated the rules of natural justice. The CA unanimously (per Peter-Odi-
li JCA with Adekeye and Aboki JJCA concurring) held inter alia that the 
proper forum for an appeal against and (or) challenge of a decision of the 
APC, is the IST and not the FHC; that the IST’s statutory jurisdiction to hear 
such an appeal is not shared with the FHC; and that the later court correctly 
declined jurisdiction.48 
The reasoning behind this judgment was that section 224(1), 234(1) 
and 361(1) of the ISA, 1999,49 together, conferred an exclusive jurisdiction 
on the IST to adjudicate on matters arising from the Act and its jurisdiction, 
is not concurrent with the FHC.50 The Appellant had contended that the 
FHC had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the APC, on the footing 
that the applicable section 236(1) of the ISA, 1999, states that a person 
who is dissatisfied with any action or decision of the Commission under the 
Act may institute an action in the Tribunal or appeal against such decision 
within the period stipulated under the Act. The Appellant construed this 
provision to suggest that an action can be filed before the IST and appeal 
could be lodged with the FHC. This, consistent with the thesis of this paper, 
was a strained interpretation, which is contrary to the statutory scheme of 
the ISA, 1999 and by extension, of the ISA, 2007, to exclude the FHC, from 
the resolution of disputes arising from securities regulation. Peter-Odili JCA 
was therefore correct to reason that the provision cannot be interpreted to 
permit an appeal from a decision of SEC to go to the FHC. 
Similarly, while it may be supposed and as was indeed argued for the 
Appellant that SEC can still be impleaded before the FHC as Federal Agen-
cy, this supposition is with respect unsustainable. This as argued above, is 
because the special jurisdictional clause in the ISA, relating to the exclusive 
adjudicatory remit of the IST over the decisions of SEC should, as a rule, be 
interpreted to derogate from the general Constitutional jurisdiction of the 
FHC. Even where concededly as here, the case for such derogation is ‘a hard 
sell’ because of the inconsistency rule, it is argued still that an action, which 
48 Ajayi (n 3) 28, [D] – [E].
49 These sections provide as follows: 
 ‘241(1) There is hereby established a body to be known as the Investments and Securities 
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “The Tribunal”) to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and 
authority conferred on it by or under this Act…
 ‘234(1) The Tribunal shall have power to adjudicate on disputes and controversies arising 
under this Act and rules and regulations made thereunder…
 ‘236(1) A person aggrieved by any action or decision of the Commission under this Act 
may institute an action in the Tribunal or appeal against such decision within the period 
stipulated under this Act.’
 These provisions are now sections 274, 284(1) and 289(1) of the ISA, 2007.
50 Ajayi (n 3) 26, [D].
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impleads the SEC before the FHC, must be shown not to have arisen from 
a SEC’s decision based on the provisions of the ISA. If the contrary were to 
be the case (impleading SEC before the FHC for a decision arising from the 
ISA) clearly, the IST’s and FHC’s jurisdictions will come into direct conflict. 
To avoid this, it is submitted therefore that in so far as it can be shown that a 
regulatory decision and (or) determination of the SEC, is rooted in the ISA, 
the IST and not the FHC ought to have the trial jurisdiction over disputes 
resulting therefrom. 
On whether the CA should have quashed the APC’s decision on the 
ground that it violated the rules of natural justice, the Appellant contended 
that the purport of proceeding leading to the decision, constituted SEC, as a 
prosecutor and judge in its own case, and allegedly that the Appellant was 
not served with the notice of hearing of the allegations against him. In refu-
tation, the Respondent case as established by evidence was to the effect that 
having been given reasonable opportunity to be heard and which opportu-
nity was not utilised by the Appellant; he cannot be heard to complain of 
lack of fair hearing. Respondent did not argue the nemo judex in causa sua 
limb of the allegation. Peter-Odili JCA, resolved the issue, in favour of the 
respondent, namely that nothing from the records showed that the APC vi-
olated the rules of natural justice. Her ladyship, reasoned consistently with 
the judgement of the Supreme Court (per Idigbe JSC) in Falomo v Lagos 
State Public Service Commission,51 that a duty on the part of an adminis-
trative body to act judicially in the sense of applying the rules of natural 
justice, may be excluded expressly or impliedly, by statute; that where a 
statutory provision excludes the need for prior hearing of the party whose 
rights are to be affected by the decision of an administrative body, and if in 
addition, the statute provides for an administrative appeal from, or judicial 
review of the body’s decision: these are sufficient to negate the existence of 
any implied duty on the part of such a body to apply the rules, before the 
original decision is made. 
With respect, it is submitted that consistent with enunciations (whilst 
discussing APC and the principles of natural justice) above that the case 
could have been decided alternatively, on the ground that a mere allegation 
of violation of natural justice will not suffice on balance, to invalidate an 
APC’s decision. Where as here, the Committee can be shown to be inde-
pendent of SEC, and that reasonable and substantial efforts were made to 
afford equal hearing to all parties to a complaint referred to it, allegations 
51 (1977) NSCC 230.
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of violation of the rules of natural justice, ought to be regarded as obfus-
catory and otiose, in that it merely serves to frustrate the dispensation of 
‘regulatory justice.’  
By and large, the judgment is to be preferred on several grounds, but 
four of these are considered particularly germane to the discourse here: 
First, it validates the statutory scheme of the ISA to exclude recourse to 
the FHC on matters arising from the Act, even where SEC is the Defendant 
and (or) Appellant on record. This is consistent with the principle enunci-
ated above that as between the FHC and IST, there has been from 1999, a 
mutually exclusive jurisdictional relation on matters arising from BOFIA, 
CAMA and FRCNA on the one hand, and ISA on the other hand, such that 
the former set of laws are within FHC’s remit and the ISA, is within IST’s 
remit. Second, it confirms that FHC cannot competently sit on appeal on a 
decision of the APC. Third, it demonstrates albeit to a limited extent that it 
takes more than mere allegation of violation of the rules of natural justice, 
to invalidate an APC’s decision. Fourth, it aligns with the principle that the 
jurisdictions of the FHC and IST are coordinate and complementary, in 
relation to the enforcement of the mixed regulatory obligations of public 
companies. Indeed regarding the last point, the decision can be rationalised 
as a useful platform for the Nigerian Supreme Court to provide a final clar-
ity of principles on the relation between the FHC and IST and on matters 
which intersect the remits of the CBN, CAC, FRC, and SEC. But can the 
same be said about Nospecto and Okeke? How correct is the decision of a 
different panel of the CA in the two cases, to the effect that the FHC has ex-
clusive jurisdiction on mixed banking corporate and securities law matters, 
particularly those commenced by the SEC under the ISA? These and other 
questions are examined below. 
Nospecto Oil & Gas Ltd v Olorunimbe & 15 Ors
In this appeal against a ruling of the IST, the parties submitted five identi-cal issues for determination. Two of these issues are relevant to the discus-
sion in this paper: (a) whether the agreement between the parties is a simple 
or a collective investment scheme contemplated by sections 153(1), 284(1)
(f) and 315 of the ISA, 2007, as to confer jurisdiction on the IST; and (b) 
whether the IST has the jurisdiction to hear the case. Appellant’s argument 
on the two issues were essentially a rerun of the arguments in support of its 
preliminary objection before the IST. These briefly, were to the effect that 
the agreement was a simple contract, which should be litigated before the 
FAMUYIWA: FORUM ISSUES IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS OF NIGERIAN PUBLIC COMPANIES         91
competent SHC, consistent with section 272 of the CFRN, 1999; and that 
by seeking reliefs against SEC and CBN, the 1st to 14th Appellants, cannot 
come before the IST. This is because section 251(1) of the CFRN, 1999, con-
fers jurisdiction on the FHC, in a matter, such as the instant where federal 
agencies are impleaded for their administrative actions. These arguments 
are contradictory, in that the Appellant in one breadth argued for the juris-
diction for the SHC and in another, for the FHC. This arguably exemplifies 
the difficulty of legal reasoning where the law is uncertain. 
Ideally, it should be quite easy for litigants to know the competent trial 
forum for a dispute arising as here, from solicitation of investment from 
the public, but where jurisdictional principles are not so clearly formulated, 
jurisdictional challenge founded often on equivocatory arguments, tend to 
take up the greater part of dispute resolution process to the detriment of 
merit of the case. The Respondents (Appellant’s investors) contended that 
the Appellant was ‘estopped’ from re-characterising the agreement as a sim-
ple contract in view of the decision of the IST in Nospecto v SEC, to the 
effect that the Appellant’s business was effectively a collective investment 
scheme – a judgment, which they argue, the Appellant did not appeal. 
The CA (per Ogunwunmiju JCA, with Pemu and Danjuma JJCA con-
curring) resolved the first issue in favour of the Appellants, to the effect that 
the agreement, subject matter of the appeal, was a collective investment 
scheme over which the IST has trial jurisdiction. Ogunwunmiju JCA rea-
soned that CAMA does not confer any right on a company to approach the 
public with collective investment schemes. Consistent with the thesis of this 
paper, it is submitted that her ladyship was right in holding that the dispute 
between the parties arose from a collective investment scheme. In support, 
it is arguable that solicitation of investment from the public, through an 
agreement, as was done by the Appellant, cannot to a convincing extent, 
be pleaded as a simple contract. Even if it were at all, a contract, it should 
be seen as one with regulatory implication in securities and investment law. 
This in turn means that the law with the ‘closest connection’ to the case is 
ISA, 2007, and the trial forum should be the IST. 
In relation to whether the IST could grant the reliefs sought by the 1st 
– 14th Respondents against the SEC and CBN, the Court of Appeal rather 
curiously and in spite of finding in favour of IST’s trial jurisdiction over the 
Appellant’s ‘business’, held that under the inconsistency rule, the validity of 
any Law or Act is determined by its consistency with the provisions of the 
Constitution. The Court also held that section 284(1) of the ISA, limits IST’s 
exclusive jurisdiction to disputes over SEC powers to regulate the Nigerian 
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capital market. Also, that Section 284(f) of the ISA 2007 gives the Tribunal 
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate in disputes arising from administration, 
management and operation of a collective investment scheme. The court in 
effect reasoned that if the claims by the Respondents were limited to com-
pelling the Appellant to stop its allegedly illegal and fraudulent business and 
banking activities, then the Tribunal would have had exclusive jurisdiction. 
‘However, since the principal claims are against SEC and CBN, the Tribunal 
has no exclusive jurisdiction to determine them…’52 
With respect, while her ladyship’s argument is sure footed in law, 
this case does not necessarily require the invocation of the inconsistency 
rule; nor does it demand the displacement of IST’s jurisdiction on the 
second issue. This submission is founded on three arguments. The first is 
to the effect that the judgment is paradoxical. This is because, the court 
as indicated above, found in favour of the ISA, 2007, and the IST’s juris-
diction over the scheme operated by the Appellant. But the court declined 
to follow through with this preliminary finding, specifically, in relation to 
its implication for the second issue concerning the proper judicial forum 
for the reliefs sought by the 1st to 14th Respondents against the SEC and 
CBN. By finding in favour of the FHC on this issue, even though the 
reliefs were necessitated by the Appellant’s fraudulent scheme, and the 
Appellant’s case was that the SHC and not the IST, has jurisdiction, the 
decision starkly contradicts, the initial finding in favour of the IST. Are the 
reliefs on closer analysis, such that ought necessarily to be sought before 
the FHC? Is the court’s reasoning, with respect, akin to taking the ‘line 
of least resistance’ to the issue and one that readily finds support in the 
inconsistency rule? The answer to these questions, it is submitted with 
respect, should be in the negative. The approach of the Court of Appeal 
here should be rejected. 
An alternative approach and one that arguably avoids the paradox in 
the judgment, after the preliminary finding in favour of the ISA, 2007, 
and IST, should have been for the Court of Appeal to hold that in so far 
as between, SEC and CBN, only the former, can be impleaded before the 
IST on the facts and law of the case; the reliefs sought by the Respondents 
would if granted by the IST, apply only to the SEC. With this approach, the 
1st – 14th Respondents can elect subsequently to proceed against the CBN 
before the FHC. 
52 (2011) LPELR – 8 933 (CA).
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Linked to the foregoing is the second argument against the judgment, 
according to which the CA’s overall approach to this case conflates a matter 
arising almost exclusively from the ISA, with one having a mixed BOFIA 
and ISA implication. On the pleadings and evidence, the case for the 1st – 
14th Respondents can be reduced into a simple allegation of fraudulent and 
unlicensed operation of a collective investment scheme, in violation of the 
ISA, 2007. Had the court, with respect, approached the matter this way, 
arguably much clarity would have been achieved to the effect that the con-
nection between this case and BOFIA, is marginal. Put differently, the case 
for the 1st – 14th Respondents is substantially if not exclusively founded on 
Appellant’s violation of the ISA, 2007. The 1st–14th Respondents’ case as 
constituted here, does not rest on Appellant’s breach of the BOFIA and 
therefore did not require the invocation of the inconsistency rule.
Lastly and as a third objection, the judgment with respect, fails to ad-
dress an arguably central question in the case, namely, which regulator as 
between the SEC and CBN, has the sole judgment enforcement obligation 
where a violation of the ISA, 2007, is established by the IST? It has been ar-
gued severally in this paper and with statutory support that the enforcement 
of ISA’s regulatory provisions fall exclusively within SEC’s remit. In effect, 
where the IST holds that ISA’s provisions have been either wholly or partly 
violated, the SEC has the sole responsibility to give effect to that judgment, 
even if the Commission is the violator. Again and with respect, had the CA 
considered this question further to its initial finding in favour of the ISA, 
and IST’s trial jurisdiction, it would arguably have been appreciated without 
invoking the inconsistency rule that IST can grant the reliefs sought by the 
1st–14th Respondents at least in relation to the SEC. 
Okeke v SEC & 2 Ors
On the facts, the Appellant was appointed as a non-executive director of Cadbury Nigeria Plc. in June 2003. In June 2006, the Annual Re-
port and Accounts of the company was sent to the SEC. On receiving the 
report, the SEC expressed concerns inter alia, on the declining profitability, 
and leverage ratio mis-statements in the company’s accounts. In response, 
the Chairman of the company, appointed PWC to investigate the concerns. 
PWC’s Report was sent to the SEC, who thereupon referred the matter to 
the 2nd Respondent (APC). The company, its directors and auditors, chal-
lenged the competence of the APC to investigate the matter before the FHC. 
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While that action was pending, the APC concluded its investigation and 
delivered a decision for the SEC’s approval.53 In consequence, the Appellant 
applied to the FHC for a judicial review of this decision and sought declar-
atory and injunctive reliefs, including an order of certiorari to quash the 
APC’s decision. The FHC (coram Mustapha CJ) upheld the APC’s decision, 
and dismissed the Appellant’s action.54 The appeal to the CA was decided 
substantially on, whether the FHC, was right in holding that the 2nd Respon-
dent (APC) had jurisdiction to adjudicate over the allegations of complicity 
in the misstatements in the Annual Report and Accounts of Cadbury Nige-
ria Plc. in view of section 251 (1) (e) of the CFRN, 1999. 
The CA unanimously held that Mustapha CJ wrongly upheld the ju-
risdiction of the APC to decide on the allegations against the Appellant. 
The court reasoned that the interpretive effect of section 251 (1) (e) of the 
CFRN is that the FHC has exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising from 
the reporting obligations imposed on public companies by CAMA.55 Note 
should be taken of the fact the court relied strongly on Skenconsult for this 
reasoning and refused to follow Ajayi.56 All the same, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the CA wrongly decided Okeke in that the rationes decidendi 
in that case that the FHC has exclusive jurisdiction in matters with mixed 
securities and corporate law flavour, and that the APC cannot adjudicate a 
regulatory matter with criminal flavour, are arguably unsupportable on four 
grounds, which are discussed below. 
First, the judgment incorrectly applied the CFRN, 1999, CAMA, and 
the ISA, 2007, to the fundamental issue in the appeal, which is whether a 
dispute arising from the regulation of the Nigeria Capital Market can be lit-
igated before the FHC. This issue is clear from the allegations referred to the 
APC, namely that: (a) the Appellant and other persons responsible for the 
running of Cadbury Nigeria Plc. authorised the filing of Annual Report of 
the company for 2005, which SEC found to contain untrue statements in vi-
olation of Rule 3(4) of the SEC Rules and Regulations 2000 (as amended);57 
53 The decision dated 27 March 2008, disqualified the Appellant and three others from oper-
ating in the Nigerian capital market and being employed in the financial services sector, and 
from holding directorship positions in a public company for a period of 5 years from the 
date of the decision. 
54 In Suit No.FHC/L/CS/483/2008: Okeke v SEC and 2 Ors, unreported judgment of the 
FHC, Lagos Judicial Division. 
55 In sections 321-331, 374 – 337 and 345 – 348 of CAMA. 
56 Okeke (n 4) 11 – 21.
57 This rule forbids the filing of a misleading or untrue document or information with the 
SEC. Violation of the rule is an offence and is punishable under Rules 3(4), 7 and 11 of the 
SEC Rules. 
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(b) the Appellant and other directors of Cadbury Nigeria Plc., in 2005, au-
thorised the issuance of a Rights Circular dated 24 August 2005, containing 
an untrue statement in contravention of Rule 3(4) of the SEC Rules; and the 
Appellant and other directors of Cadbury Nigeria Plc. neglected to deliver 
funds for the payment of dividends declared to shareholders within seven 
working days after the Annual General Meeting in violation of Rule 204 of 
the SEC Rules.58 From these allegations, it seems incontrovertible that the 
fundamental issue before the Court of Appeal, turned on alleged violations 
of the Rules made by the SEC, pursuant to section 13(a) of the ISA, 2007. 
Had the appeal, been approached in this light, the CA, would indeed have 
appreciated that the relevant question(s) for determination could be found 
in the issues submitted by the Respondents. Appellant’s successful invoca-
tion of section 251 (1) (e) of the CFRN, 1999, and reporting obligations 
contained in CAMA, is with respect, obfuscatory. It is obfuscatory because 
it was to all appearances, aimed at and did successfully confuse the real issue 
in the appeal and gave the impression that the IST and APC are judicial con-
trivances meant to usurp the jurisdiction of the FHC under section 251(1)
(e) of the CFRN, 1999. In failing to see through this artifice, the Court of 
Appeal, in turn, misapplied these laws. 
Consistent with the principles enunciated above, section 251 (1) (e) and 
the reporting obligations of public companies in CAMA should now be read 
as inapplicable to securities and capital market matters, which since 1999 
are within the exclusive regulatory and adjudicatory remit of SEC and IST 
respectively. Specifically, the point (obita) by Saulawa JCA at (p. 19) that the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the FHC in section 251 (1) (e) (r) ‘cannot be whit-
tled down or taken away by an ordinary Act (ISA) of the National Assembly 
in the absence of any amendment to the provision’ is with respect unduly 
formalistic, in the sense of insisting that an amendment to section 251 (1) 
must necessarily be contained within that section. This is just as formalistic 
as arguing that a court or tribunal established by the National Assembly 
pursuant to section 6 (4)(a) of the CFRN, 1999, must be reflected in the 
judicial hierarchy, contained in Chapter VII of the Constitution before such 
a court can be regarded as a superior court. 
To the extent that section 6(4) (a) empowers the National Assembly to 
establish additional courts to adjudicate on matters on which the Assembly 
is competent to legislate; and where a court (such as the IST) is thus estab-
lished to adjudicate on matters which were hitherto within the remit of the 
58 Okeke (n 4) 15 – 16. 
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FHC and a judgment of that new court operates as a judgment of the FHC, 
a purposive interpretation of this change in law it is submitted, should be 
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the FHC is thereby ‘whittled down’ in rela-
tion to matters assigned to the new court. 
But again this submission remains ‘haunted’ by the argument that sec-
tion 6(4), of the CFRN, 1999, only empowers the National Assembly to 
establish courts that are subordinate to the FHC, not those of equal or coor-
dinate jurisdiction. This means that ultimately for statutory clarity the sub-
mission requires a judicial (the Supreme Court’s in the circumstance) impri-
matur, so as to settle finally the status of the IST in relation to the FHC. Such 
imprimatur can also take the form of a legislative amendment to sections 6 
(4) and 251(1) of the CFRN, 1999, consistent with this submission and other 
enunciations in the paper on the relation between the two judicial fora.59 
Linked to the first ground of objection is the second, which is to the 
effect that the Court of Appeal in Okeke, conflated securities regulation 
with general corporate regulation. Arguably, the province of securities reg-
ulation in Nigeria can be approached from the long title to the ISA, 2007, 
namely, the ‘…regulation of the (capital) market to ensure the protection of 
investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent market and reduction of 
systemic risk.’ The remit of corporate law in Nigeria can also be approached 
from the long title to CAMA, which is to ‘… provide for the incorpora-
tion of companies and incidental matters of registration of business names 
and the incorporation of trustees of certain committees, bodies and associa-
tions.’ The last remit mirrors what Armour et al categorised as the principal 
function of corporate law, which is to provide business enterprises with the 
legal form that possesses the five attributes of legal personality, limited lia-
bility, transferable shares, delegated management, and investor ownership.60 
The fact that this categorisation contains ‘investor ownership’ shows 
59 Speaking of amendment, the case of the National Industrial Court can be referenced for 
support in this context: Following the Supreme Court judgment in Oloruntoba-Oju v Do-
pamu (2008) 7 NWLR [Pt. 1085] 1, the CFRN, 1999 was amended though the Constitu-
tional of Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act of 2010, to give the court, ex-
clusive jurisdiction in civil cases and matters relating to labour, employment, trade unions, 
and industrial relations. This case for amendment is further supported by the dictum of 
Ambi-Usi Danjuma J.C.A in Nospecto to the effect that the National Assembly may amend 
section 251(1)(r), by adding the following proviso: ‘without prejudice to the determination 
of all such causes or matters as are by any statute or Act of the National Assembly vested 
in any specialised court or Tribunal, the parties thereto not notwithstanding.’ Indeed, his 
Lordship noted pointedly that ‘[i]t is only by a constitutional amendment that the situation 
can be saved: Nospecto (n 5). 
60 J. Armour, H. Hausmann and R. Kraakman, ‘What is Corporate Law?’ in R. Kraakman 
et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn, 
Oxford: OUP 2009) 1 – 2. 
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that corporate and securities regulation will inevitably overlap in the area 
of investors’ protection, and reporting (transparency) obligation of incorpo-
rated companies to investors. Yet, if one were to apply the respective remits 
of securities regulation and corporate law and as well the categorisation 
offered by Armour et al, to the allegations leading to the appeal in Okeke, 
it is arguable that the case falls entirely within securities regulation. This is 
because the key concern here relates to investors protection and capital mar-
ket integrity. In fact, the document (Annual Report), which partly, formed 
the basis of the allegations, was filed with the SEC and not with the CAC. 
Admittedly, a counterpart obligation to file the document with the CAC 
exists in the CAMA, but the allegations leading to the appeal did not arise 
from this obligation. It is thus submitted with respect that Okeke neither 
arose, nor fell within the province of Nigerian corporate law, anymore than 
it can be said that matters relating to the integrity of the Nigerian capital 
market can be dealt with by an agency (CAC) established to regulate incor-
poration of companies. The appeal, it is further submitted ought to have 
been decided consistently with the statutory scheme for securities dispute 
resolution embodied in the ISA, 2007. 
Further and moving on to the third ground of objection, because the 
Court of Appeal conflated the securities regulation with corporate law, the 
court’s interpretive analysis of the regulatory and disciplinary powers of 
SEC, particularly in relation to the use of the APC, is with respect incorrect. 
Moreover, it suppresses the statutory intendment to exclude the FHC from 
the resolution of disputes arising from securities regulation. The Court (at p 
22 – 23) conceives the APC to be a court, the existence of which invidiously 
makes SEC the complainant and judge. This is unsupportable in view of sec-
tions 13 and 310 of the ISA, 2007. Section 13 sets out the functions of the 
Commission, including specifically, protecting the integrity of the securities 
market against all forms of abuses. Section 310, empowers the Commission 
to delegate its functions to one or more Committees, provided a decision of 
such Committee(s) shall be subject to the Commission’s confirmation. 
A logical incident of the two sections, it is submitted, is that SEC can 
create a committee such as the APC; to investigate and recommend sanc-
tions for acts which have the tendency of comprising the integrity of the 
capital market. Where, as the case is with the APC, the proceedings of an 
administrative committee are quasi-judicial in nature that does not credi-
bly mean that the committee is a court, any more than we can regard the 
Commission which delegates its powers to the committee as a court, had it 
conducted the proceedings itself. The fact that a decision of the APC, is even 
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subject to the Commission’s confirmation shows that it (APC) is at best, an 
advisory disciplinary committee of the SEC and not a proper judicial forum, 
for the adjudication of securities disputes. Its creation does not therefore to 
any convincing extent, implicate a usurpation of the functions of the IST or 
those of the FHC. Indeed a right of appeal against the committee (as con-
firmed by SEC) to the IST does exist in law.61 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the CA, would have reached the same 
conclusion whether it was the APC or SEC itself that exercises the admin-
istrative disciplinary power. So the argument has to be approached on the 
basis that SEC effectively exercises this power. Now, one question is wheth-
er SEC can be a complainant, investigator, and judge in the exercise of its 
administrative power. 
This question was indeed raised in Appellant’s fourth issue, on which 
to a subsidiary extent, the CA decided the appeal against the Respondents. 
Note should be taken of the fact that the FHC had found as a fact, on this 
issue that there was no evidence showing that members of SEC’s in-house 
investigation team, also sat as members of the APC and the Appellant did 
not make out a case on breach of the principles of natural justice of natural 
justice.62 In contrast, the CA upheld the Appellant’s argument that the APC 
proceeding in this case violated the principles. Saulawa JCA articulated the 
reasoning behind this decision, to the effect that ‘the interlocking relation-
ship between the SEC and APC’ and the manner in which the proceeding 
was conducted (i.e. that the identities of APC members were not communi-
cated to the Appellant) amounted to a ‘violation of the due process.’ 
With respect, this decision and the accompanying reasoning, are un-
convincing in that a mere apprehension of interlocking relationship in this 
context, without proof on the balance that the relationship could lead to a 
reasonable conclusion that the independence and impartiality of APC are 
thus manacled, is not a sure ground to find in favour of breach of the princi-
ples of natural justice. Comparatively, the Administrative Proceedings Panel 
(APP) of the United States of America’s Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion is interlocked with the Commission in the sense that it is effectively an 
in-house specialist quasi-judicial committee established by the Commission. 
Even so, objections to APP’s proceedings are rarely founded on the violation 
of the principles of natural justice. Rather and as exemplified by decision in 
Gupta it is not procedural permissible for the Commission to split a prose-
61 ISA 2007, s 289(1).
62 CA/L/13/2009, 23.
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cution into two, preferring to litigate one half before a conventional court 
and the other half before ‘its home court,’ the APP and thereby deprive a 
defendant of the benefit of jury trial that is available in conventional courts. 
Specifically, a preferable approach, consistently with the enunciations in 
this paper, would have been for the CA to establish from the records (if at all 
necessary in view of FHC’s finding on this point) whether the APC is struc-
tured independently from SEC, and whether the Committee reasonably ac-
corded all parties to the proceeding leading to the appeal, equal opportuni-
ties to be heard, orally or in writing. These findings it is argued, could have 
led to a much more engaging analysis of the extent to which the principles 
were reflected in the proceeding than the inquiry into whether the names 
of APC members were communicated to the Appellant. Findings resulting 
from this analysis it is further argued, would have reflected a nuanced appli-
cation of the principles to proceedings before a body such as the APC as was 
arguably done by the FHC, in the instant case, and the CA panel in Ajayi.
Equally unsupportable, as a fourth objection, is the CA’s position (per 
Augie JCA’s concurring judgment) to the effect that the APC, ‘cannot ad-
judicate over a matter with criminal flavour.’63 It is unsupportable because 
it rests on the proposition that an administrative trial of a crime must nec-
essarily result in a conviction, which can only be pronounced by a conven-
tional court.64 
This proposition, with respect, is flawed, in that a finding by an admin-
istrative body such as the APC that a respondent to a complaint brought 
before it, is guilty of a crime, in reality, operates as a disciplinary finding 
before a regulatory sanction. It does not amount to usurpation of the crim-
inal jurisdiction of the court any more than a regulatory sanction without 
such an administrative proceeding would have been similarly usurpatory. 
Moreover, where as argued above, an administrative body such as the APC 
is legally empowered to decide complaints relating to the rights and ob-
ligations of others, that body should be seen as a tribunal established by 
law under section 36(1) of the CFRN, 1999. This means in essence that it 
should be able to dispose totally the case before it, and (where as here, it 
is necessary) make a finding of guilt on matters falling within its remit, but 
without prejudice to the right a party affected by that finding to appeal to 
higher tribunals or courts. 
63 CA/L/13/2009, 25. For this decision, Augie J.C.A., relied on the Nnaemeka-Agu J.S.C. in 
Baba v N.C.A.T.C. (1995) 5 NWLR [Pt. 192] 388. 
64 ibid. 
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6. CONCLUSION
Overall, jurisdictional relations over the regulatory obligations of public companies in Nigeria – between two judicial fora (FHC and IST)- rep-
resents a classic regulatory conundrum. Not the least because of the lack of 
clarity of enabling statutory principles and inconsistent case law authorities. 
As a contribution, and to assist in resolving the legal uncertainty fostered by 
this conundrum, the paper has inter alia, argued for the adoption of some 
normative principles including that of mutually exclusive jurisdiction. 
By and large, forum questions discussed in this article are subset of the 
perceived inadequacies of the legal and institutional architecture of corpo-
rate and financial regulation, which tends to create tensions amongst reg-
ulatory agencies and judicial. Such tensions cannot be totally eliminated 
in a regulatory system, but how they are managed through a continuous 
reappraisal of the underlying regulatory norms and principles, will to a rea-
sonable extent impact on the effectiveness of the prevailing regulatory ap-
proach. Managing and responding to the tensions effectively, often requires 
statutory reform and a re-alignment of the institutional regulatory structure 
to achieve a much more effective regulation. This has been the approach and 
contribution of this article. 
